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Abstract
Based on a substantially larger data set (in both regional and temporal coverage) than the
existing literature, we investigate the theoretically ambiguous link between income inequality
and per capita emissions using cross-country panel data. We ﬁnd that the relationship depends
on the level of income. Using an arguably superior group-ﬁxed eﬀects estimator, we show that
for low and middle-income economies, higher income inequality is associated with lower carbon
emissions while in upper middle-income and high-income economies, higher income inequality
increases per capita emissions. The result is robust to the inclusion of plausible transmission
variables as well as diﬀerent data sources or aggregations.
JEL codes: Q0, Q1, Q3
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1 Introduction
Global poverty and climate change are two major challenges facing mankind in the twenty-ﬁrst
century. Economic growth leads to absolute poverty reduction, particularly if it is not associated
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with rising income inequality (e.g. Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Bourguignon, 2003). There is a sub-
stantial literature that investigates the relationship between income and carbon dioxide emissions,
the greenhouse eﬀect is primarily responsible for the increase in global surface temperature. This
literature suggests that economic growth, at least up to a certain level of economic development,
increases greenhouse gases (IPCC, 2014; Steckel et al., 2014). Consequently, from the perspective
of a developing country, economic growth may alleviate poverty, but intensify climate problems.
A related issue is whether there is also a tradeoﬀ between income inequality and global warming,
as stated by Ravallion et al. (2000). As we discuss below, the theoretical and empirical literature
generates mixed results on this question, pointing to diﬀerent mechanisms and eﬀects. Much of
this literature is, however, based on rather simple econometric methods and older data on both
inequality as well as emissions. We improve upon the existing literature in both of these respects.
A particular econometric innovation with respect to the existing literature is that we use a group
ﬁxed eﬀects estimator (Bonhomme and Manresa, 2015) as opposed to a standard ﬁxed eﬀects
estimator. This grouped ﬁxed eﬀects estimator takes into account that diﬀerent regions of the
world adopt clean technologies at diﬀerent rates. Furthermore, the estimator arguable deals better
with endogeneity due to unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, the within transformation associated
with the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator would eliminate the relatively small intertemporal variation that
exists in the Gini data (see the literature on the debates on inequality and growth literature, e.g.
Forbes, 2000, and Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2003).
To the best of our knowledge, only three papers are closely related to our empirical investiga-
tion of the link between per capita carbon dioxide emissions, per capita output, and inequality.
Ravallion et al. (2000) use a pooled OLS model that interacts inequality with a third-order poly-
nomial of income, a time trend, and population size. The panel data set consists of 42 countries
over the period from 1975 to 1992. The authors use one (average) inequality measure per country.
They ﬁnd that there is a static tradeoﬀ between reducing carbon emissions and reducing income
inequality. Borghesi (2006) applies OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects panel data estimators to a panel data
set of 37 countries for the period 1988 to 1995. He prefers the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator and ﬁnds
that inequality does not have an eﬀect on emissions. For the pooled OLS estimator, he ﬁnds a
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statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect between income inequality and carbon dioxide emissions.
Heerink et al. (2001) use a cross-section design with 65 country observations from about 1985.
The speciﬁcation includes income, its square, and the Gini coeﬃcient. Similar to Ravallion et al
(2000), they ﬁnd that income inequality is negatively associaed with carbon emissions per capita.
All three studies rely on the inequality measure from the data set described in Deininger and Squire
(1996). Our analysis uses expanded and improved data from Solt (2009), which is derived from
the much broader, more consistent, and more reliable WIDER World Income Inequality Database.
This allows us to use a larger set of countries (158 instead of 65 resp. 37) and observations from
1980 up to 2008, compared to 1975-1992 and 1988-1995 in the existing studies. Furthermore, we
argue that cross-section estimates based on pooled OLS are arguably not the most appropriate
tools for this analysis, and favor the grouped ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. We also compare our analysis
also to a standard ﬁxed eﬀects estimator.1
We ﬁnd that the relationship between income inequality and emissions depends on income
levels. At lower levels of incomes higher income inequality reduces emissions while at higher levels
of income, the eﬀect is reverse. The group ﬁxed eﬀects also generate interesting diﬀerentiated time
trends linked closely to trends in energy intensity in the diﬀerent groups.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews theoretical arguments in the
existing literature, emphasizing that the relationship between income inequality and emissions is
ambiguous. Section 3 describes the panel data set. Section 4 outlines the ﬁxed eﬀects model for
our setting, and reveals its shortcoming in the current context. We then argue that a group ﬁxed
eﬀects estimator is more appropriate, and describe that model. The main results and a sensitivity
analysis are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
1Other papers less related to our work consider the inequality-emissions relationship for small groups of industri-
alized countries. Magnani (2000) uses public expenditure for environmental protection as the dependent variable,
and uses only 17-52 observations for developed countries. Marsiliani and Renstrom (2003) use sulfur, nitrogen and
carbon dioxide and a diﬀerent inequality measure: ratio of households ranked at top 90th percentile to the median
household and two panels of 7 and 10 industrialized countries over 1978-97.
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Argument Basis Sign Reference
Political economy Cost-beneﬁt power-weighted Positive Boyce (1994)
decision rule
Cooperation Positive Marsiliani and
Renstrom (2003)
Voting for pollution policy Ambiguous McAusland (2003) and
Gassebner et al. (2008)
Variable MPE Higher MPE for the rich Negative Ravallion et al. (2000) and
Heerink et al. (2001)
Emulation Conspicuous consumption Positive Veblen (1899)
Table 1: Summary of theoretical arguments in the literature, and the implied sign for the correlation
between income inequality and emissions.
2 Theory
Starting in the mid-1990's, economists have developed several theoretical arguments to explain the
relationship between economic inequality and environmental degradation. While some of the ar-
guments entail a positive association, namely the "equality hypothesis proposed by Boyce (1994),
Torras and Boyce (1998) and Borghesi (2006), others argue that greater inequality could also be
negatively associated to emissions (Heerink et al. 2001; Ravallion et al. 2000; Scruggs 1998). If
the second argument prevails, there will be a tradeoﬀ between redistribution policies and environ-
mental quality. Table 1 presents a list of the main theoretical arguments discussed in the previous
literature.
Boyce (1994) proposes that greater inequality could increase environmental degradation via the
impact on the rate of time preference and via a cost-beneﬁt analysis. Boyce (1994) and Torras and
Boyce (1998) assume that environmental quality is a public good and eﬀective demand requires
public policy solutions to this market failure. The factors they point out, already mentioned by
Grossman and Krueger (1995), which allow economies to redress market failure more eﬃciently are
vigilance and advocacy. These two factors increase with per capita income because individuals
gain greater power to make their demand eﬀective through the political process. In particular,
some individuals beneﬁt from economic activities that generate pollution, whereas other citizens,
adversely aﬀected by pollution, bear net cost. The latter exercise vigilance and are in charge to de-
mand for environmental controls, whereas the former attempt to prevent that those environmental
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controls are established or strengthened. Assuming that in more unequal societies those who ben-
eﬁt from pollution are more powerful than those who bear the cost, the beneﬁt-cost rule will lead
to predict an ineﬃcient high level of pollution. This implies a positive correlation between income
inequality and pollution. A controversial assumption they made to reach this outcome is that net
beneﬁt from polluting activities is positively correlated with individual income. However, Scruggs
(1998) claims that wealthy and powerful individuals do not necessarily prefer more degradation
than the rest and he also questions Boyce's underlying assumption that more democratic societies
produce better environmental results than other political regimes. Also, it is unclear whether this
argument, which has been formulated for environmental degradation more generally, also holds for
carbon emissions. In the case of carbon emissions, costs are not only felt locally but globally and
emission control is a global public good, where it is unclear that national income ineuqality will
necesarily play a criticial role in this meachnism.
In the same line of reasoning as Boyce (1994), Borghesi (2006) suggests that an increase in
inequality hinders the way for public policy solutions to environmental problems and therefore
greater inequality can contribute to increasing emissions. Also Marsiliani and Renström (2003) ar-
gue that higher inequality leads to less environmental protection and consequently higher emissions
in an overlapping generations model with a majority elected representative. The author points to
the anecdotal evidence that Scandinavian countries are the most protective of their environment
among the developed countries, being as well the most egalitarian. A diﬀerent argument is put
forward by McAusland (2003) and Gassebner et al. (2008). Both suggest that inequality may
inﬂuence emissions through the channel of factor ownership and voting. According to McAusland
(2003) the relationship between income inequality and demand for pollution policy depends on the
level of ownership concentration and openness to trade in countries. Hence, empirical tests of the
relationship between income inequality and environmental quality are expected to yield ambiguous
results. The author suggests controlling for the source of income inequality in each country as well
as for the endogenous price eﬀects of its pollution policy.
Gassebener et al. similarly argue that, at least in richer countries, rising income inequality is
associated with accelerated industrial decline (through increasing outsourcing of industrial produc-
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tion as well as skill-biased technical change), which in turn reduces the political power of industrial
producers and workers, thereby reducing their ability to bloc measures to reduce pollution or emis-
sions. Extending this line of argument, one could imagine that in poorer countries, the political
clout of the rising industrial sector is rising as well, leading to less environmental regulation, par-
ticularly when richer population groups are associated with the rising industrial sector. Thus this
line of argument could predict a diﬀerent correlation between income inequality and empissions in
poor and rich countries.
While these studies generally suggest that increasing income inequality will increase emissions,
a second group of studies predicts exactly the opposite. Ravallion et al. (2000) point out that
in a simple model where the marginal propensity to emit (MPE) varies with income, inequality
measures enter the income-emission relationship, a point also made by Heerink et al. (2001) In
fact, they point out that there will be a biased estimate in the income-emission relationship if
income inequality is not included in the estimation. There is considerable evidence from micro
studies in several countries that the MPE does indeed vary with the level of income, with most
studies ﬁnding that the MPE falls with income (see Holtz-Eakin and Selden, 1995; Heil and Selden,
1999; Grunewald et al., 2012; Steckel et al., 2014; Serino and Klasen, 2015). This would imply
that higher inequality would reduce emissions. This could be even more the case if, particularly
in poorer countries, higher inequality would imply that a large share of the population essentially
lives outside the carbon economy, i.e. they lack access to electricity and other forms of modern
energy. For them the MPE might be close to 0; thus increasing their share in the populaion would
lower aggregate emissions.
Finally, based on the emulation theory originally due to Veblen (1899), we hypothesize that
in more unequal societies individuals in a given social class tend to compare themselves with the
members of the immediately superior social class and emulate their consumption patterns. In this
way, more unequal societies might have a higher propensity to consume more polluting intensive
goods and services (such as big cars, long-distrance vacations, etc.) that are associated to a higher
MPE and therefore to higher emissions in comparison to egalitarian societies.
In summary, the theoretical literature is ambiguous about the sign of the relationship between
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inequality and emissions that is conditioned to a number of underlying assumptions. In this respect,
we aim to contribute with an empirical approach to shed light on some of the abovementioned
theories. The contrasting theoretical arguments also suggest that the relationship is probably
heterogeneous across countries, leading to diﬀerent levels of emissions across countries, as well as
to diﬀerences in income and inequality elasticities. In fact, it appears that some theories seem
to suggest that high inequality is associated with more emissions in richer countries, while the
relationship might be the reverse in poorer countries. Our speciﬁcation below will enable us to
examine such a non-monotonic relationship.
3 Data
We use an unbalanced panel data set with annual measurements from 1980 to 2008, covering 158
countries. The total number of observations is 3966. This data set is much more extensive than
those used in the existing literature on the relationship between income inequality, GDP, and
carbon emissions. The corner stone of our data set are the Gini coeﬃcients from the Standardized
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) by Solt (2009). For the SWIID, a missing data
algorithm was used to ﬁll in the Gini measurements and to make the data from diﬀerent sources
comparable. Solt (2009) diﬀerentiates between before and after tax income inequality. Many high
income countries apply strong redistributive policies, which lead to overall lower after-tax income
inequality than before tax income inequality. We use after-tax income inequality measure because
we are interested in the eﬀect of redistributive policies, and want to account for those already in
place.
The data on carbon dioxide emissions are from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory data set,
which covers emissions from fossil fuel, natural gas consumption, and cement manufacturing (Boden
et al. 2012). This data set is widely used in the literature but faces two major shortcomings, see
e.g. Borghesi (2006). First, it is estimated data which is based on the consumption of fossil
fuels multiplied with the average carbon content of the respective fuel type. Second, it does not
account for emissions from agriculture, life stock, deforestation or land use change. Therefore, it
will underestimate the carbon dioxide emissions for countries with a strong agricultural sector.
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Variable Source Unit Mean SD Min Max
Main variables
CO2 emissions / capita ORNL metric tons 3.79 4.66 <0.01 35.2
GDP per capita WDI mln 1990 $ 8879 10254 150.8 72783
Gini SWIID percentage scale 37.73 10.29 15.05 71.33
Controls
Agriculture, value added WDI % of GDP 18.92 15.16 0.06 93.98
Manufacturing, value added WDI % of GDP 15.91 7.91 0.36 46.25
Services, etc., value added WDI % of GDP 51.06 13.50 3.67 92.24
Urban population WDI % of population 50.70 23.05 4.08 100
Polity CSP - 2.59 6.95 -10.00 10.00
Table 2: Summary statistics for our unbalanced panel data set (n = 158, T ∈ {1980, · · · , 2008}). Total
number of observations is 3966.
But as shown in the recent IPCC report (IPCC, 2014), our data data cover about 75% of total
GHG emissions (when expressed in CO2 equivalents) and this share is fairly stable over time.
GDP per capita and further control variables are taken from the World Development Indicators,
see World Bank (2012). The measure of GDP that we use is based on purchasing power parity,
and measured in constant 2005 International Dollars. The WDI also supplies the shares of value
added of agriculture, manufacturing and the service sector in percentages of total GDP, and the
proportion of the population that lives in cities (Urban population). Finally, we use the Polity
measure, see Marshall and Cole (2011), which is a measure of state fragility that ranges from +10
(strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). An overview of the variables, with summary
statistics, are given in Table 2.
4 Econometric model
This section describes the ﬁxed eﬀects model and the group ﬁxed eﬀects model, which we use
to investigate empirically the relationship between emissions, GDP, and income inequality. We
emphasize that the group ﬁxed eﬀects estimator, proposed by Bonhomme and Manresa (2015), is
an attractive alternative to the commonly used ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. The results for both models
are described in Section 5.
For country i at time t, let eit be log CO2 emissions per capita, and let yit denote log GDP per
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capita. Furthermore, let git denote the log of the Gini coeﬃcient, which is our preferred measure of
income inequality. Additional explanatory variables are collected in a vector Xit. A useful starting
point for our analysis is the following ﬁxed eﬀects model:
eit = αi + λt + β1yit + β2y
2
it + β3git + β4yitgit +Xitγ + uit, (1)
with the standard assumptions on the error term uit, and allowing for an unrestricted relationship
between the country- and time-speciﬁc eﬀects (αi, λt) and the covariates (ﬁxed eﬀects). The
quadratic speciﬁcation in (yit, git) serves as an approximation to a general, nonlinear relationship
between emissions, GDP, and income inequality. The squared income inequality term is omitted,
as it is highly correlated with git, and our results are not sensitive to its omission.
Note that the quadratic income term allows the relationship between emissions and income
to be non-monotonic. For example, it allows for the inverted U shape that is documented in
the literature on the environmental Kuznets curve. The interaction term between income and
inequality allows the relationship between income inequality and emissions to depend on income.
In particular, we are interested in the elasticity of emissions per capita with respect to income
inequality, which in this case is given by
η ≡ %∆Eit
%∆Git
≈ β3 + β4yit.
This elasticity depends on the current level of GDP per capita. For example, if β3 < 0 and β4 > 0,
the elasticity is positive only if a country is rich enough, i.e. yit > y
∗ = −β3/β4:
Models such as (1) are widely used in economics, and in the existing empirical papers on the
relationship between income inequality and emissions. In particular, Ravallion et al. (2000) ignore
heterogeneity, but allow for a cubic income term. Their omission of country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects
is rejected by our empirical results. Borghesi (2006) uses a ﬁxed eﬀects model, but leaves out the
interaction term between income and inequality. A further diﬀerence between the approach in
Borghesi (2006) and our ﬁxed eﬀects approach is that we use a more extensive, higher quality data
set.
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The ﬁxed eﬀects model (1) provides a ﬂexible way to control for unobserved heterogeneity at
the country level. A drawback is that the time eﬀect λt is restricted to be the same for all countries.
Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) provide a useful alternative with their group ﬁxed eﬀects (GFE)
model. Assume that we can categorize countries in a number of groups, indexed by j = 1, · · · , J .
The number of groups j must be small compared to the number of countries. Denote by j(i) the
group that country i belongs to. An estimator is proposed for the parameters in
eit = αj(i),t + β1yit + β2y
2
it + β3git + β4yitgit +Xitγ + uit, (2)
without requiring the researcher to specify j(i). Rather than deciding on group membership before
the analysis, it is estimated along with the other parameters in this model. Group membership
dummies and regression coeﬃcient are jointly estimated by minimizing the sum of squares of
residuals. Restrictions on the error term uit are not meaningfully diﬀerent from those in model
(1).
The most important diﬀerence between the ﬁxed eﬀects and GFE models is the restriction on
the evolution of unobserved heterogeneity. The ﬁxed eﬀects model allows for an eﬀect αit = αi+λt
for country i at time t, which restricts all countries to have the same pattern over time. In
contrast, the GFE model allows for an eﬀect αit = αj(i),t, restricting the pattern to be the same
for all countries within a group, but allowing diﬀerent groups to have fully distinct patterns. Note
that these two models are not nested.
For our setting, the GFE model is an attractive alternative to the ﬁxed eﬀects model. To see
this, we temporarily abstract from our nonlinear world and from the inﬂuence of income inequality
and consider a very simple relationship between GDP per capita (Yit) and carbon emissions per
capita (Eit), see e.g. Ikefuji et al. (2014):
Eit = σit (1− µit)Yit,
where σit and µit are the emissions-to-output ratio and abatement factors for country i at time t.
The emissions-to-output ratio σit can be seen as a technology parameter that measures the extent
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to which clean technology is used in the economy, or the average carbon intensity of the technology
used in production. In this simple model, we would have
eit = log σit + log (1− µit) + yit
= αit + yit.
Using a standard ﬁxed eﬀects model with time dummies restricts
log σit + log (1− µit) = αi + λt,
which requires that the changes in emissions-to-output ratio and abatement policies are the same for
all countries. This does not seem plausible, and is not in line with assumptions of climate-economy
models. For example, when calibrating his DICE model, Nordhaus (2010) writes: Technological
change is projected for a frontier region (the United States), and other countries are assumed to
converge partway to the frontier. This is not consistent with the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation. The
GFE model, on the other hand, assumes that the world can be divided into several regions who
have similar trends in these unobservables.
There are two further advantages of the GFE estimator. First, the time-varying group ﬁxed
eﬀects are arguably better suited to deal with endogeneity due to unobserved time-varying hetero-
geneity. Second, since the intertemporal variation in the Gini is relatively small compared to the
cross-country variation, the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator would take out a large share of the between-
country variation. We refer to the debate on the inequality and growth, see e.g. Forbes (2000)
and Banerjee and Duﬂo (2003).
5 Results
This section presents the results of our empirical analysis. It describes and reports on two bench-
mark models, and then performs a sensitivity analysis. Our main ﬁnding is that, below a certain
level of GDP per capita, there is a negative relationship between income inequality and per capita
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OLS FE GFE
Parameters
yit 2.76*** 2.72*** 3.29***
(0.27) (0.93) (0.27)
y2it -0.18*** -0.15*** −0.18***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
git -4.35*** -1.18 −2.20***
(0.41) (1.14) (0.43)
yitgit 0.38*** 0.13 0.24***
(0.05) (0.13) (0.05)
Emission-inequality elasticity
U.S. (2005) -0.31 0.21 0.35
India (2005) -1.42 −0.17 −0.35
Threshold, y∗ 11.45 9.02 9.17
Country eﬀects No Yes Group
Year eﬀects Yes Yes Group
Number of groups - - 5
Observations 2939 2939 2937
R2 0.85 0.98 0.97
Table 3: Parameter estimates for the benchmark model. Dependent variable: log of per capita carbon
dioxide emissions, eit. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
emissions. This suggests that, for low income countries, lowering inequality will result in higher
levels of carbon emissions. For richer countries, reductions in income inequality will simultaneously
cause emissions to decrease.
Table 3 reports the coeﬃcients for our benchmark models, which do not include variables other
than income and income inequality. The ﬁrst column contains the results from ordinary least
squares (OLS). The second and the third present the results from the ﬁxed eﬀects and grouped
ﬁxed eﬀects model, respectively. The group ﬁxed eﬀects model uses ﬁve groups, based on informal
investigation of the change in the criterion function.
Several ﬁndings are worth reporting. First, in all models, we ﬁnd that the relationship between
income inequality and emissions depends on the level of GDP per capita, i.e. the coeﬃcient of
the interaction term is positive in all speciﬁcations and statistically signiﬁcant in the OLS and the
group ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. In particular, in all models, a country has to be above a certain
threshold income for the elasticity between emissions and income inequality to become positive.
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Figure 1: Estimated emission-inequality elasticities for a group of countries in 2005, for the benchmark
grouped ﬁxed eﬀects model.
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For the ﬁxed eﬀects and group ﬁxed eﬀects model, threshold income y∗ is in-sample and around
the income levels of upper middle income countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Romania or South
Africa ($8290 and $9573). Figure 1 displays a range of estimated elasticities for an arbitrary set
of countries in 2005 for the group ﬁxed eﬀects model. This demonstrates our key ﬁnding: lowering
inequality will be good for the environment and decrease carbon dioxide levels in countries above
a certain income threshold of GDP per capita.
Second, the three models yield quite diﬀerent results for the estimated elasticities. The OLS
estimate for the threshold y∗ is out-of-sample, and the estimated elasticity for the US in 2005 is
negative. For India in 2005, the emission-inequality relationship is strongly negative and, with an
elasticity of 1.42, highly elastic. This deviates from the ﬁnding of the panel data estimators, who
ﬁnd an in-sample turning point. The relatively poor ﬁt of the OLS regression leads us to reject
the absence of heterogeneity. A Hausman test rejects the random eﬀects speciﬁcation at the 1%
level. Third, in all models, we ﬁnd an inverted-U relationship between carbon dioxide emissions
and income, in accordance with the literature on the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC).
Fourth, the groups and their time trends, as estimated by the group ﬁxed eﬀects estimator, can
be meaningfully interpreted. The groups are described in Table 4 and the estimated time trends
are depicted in Figure 2. Group membership can be characterized by diﬀerences in the energy
intensity (EI) and its evolution over time. On the one hand, groups 1 and 2 contain countries
with high levels of EI over the period (0.62 and 1.17 Kg/$1000 US $), whereas countries in groups
4 and 5 have a relatively low average EI (0.32 and 0.23). Group 3 includes countries with the
lowest average EI (0.17). On the other hand, the levels of EI have been drastically reduced in
group 2, moderately reduced in groups 1, 4 and 5 and remain fairly stable in group 3. More
speciﬁcally, group 3 contains countries mainly located in Latin America and Africa. Some of these
are resource-abundant countries, e.g. Brazil and Costa Rica, and have been very active in the
recent past in terms of environmental policies. Most EU countries are in groups 4 and 5, which
are the biggest groups. Group 2 contains only 8 countries, which are all located in Central Europe
and Asia and are characterized by very high levels of EI in the 1990s, which experienced drastic
reductions in the 1990s and 2000s.
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Group 1 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
Australia Albania Algeria Angola
Belarus Botswana Armenia Argentina
Bosnia and Herzegovina Brazil Bangladesh Austria
Bulgaria Burkina Faso Belgium Belize
Canada Cameroon Benin Bolivia
Czech Republic Cape Verde Burundi Cambodia
Estonia Chad Cyprus Central African Republic
Guinea-Bissau Colombia Denmark Chile
Guyana Costa Rica Egypt, Arab Rep. Comoros
India El Salvador Finland Cote d'Ivoire
Jordan Gabon Georgia Croatia
Kyrgyz Republic Guatemala Germany Djibouti
Luxembourg Haiti Ghana Dominican Republic
Macedonia, FYR Lao PDR Greece Ecuador
Mauritania Madagascar Hungary Ethiopia
Poland Mali Indonesia Fiji
Russian Federation Mauritius Iran, Islamic Rep. France
Sierra Leone Namibia Ireland Gambia, The
South Africa Nepal Israel Guinea
Suriname Panama Jamaica Honduras
Trinidad and Tobago Paraguay Japan Hong Kong, China
United States Peru Korea, Rep. Iceland
Sri Lanka Malaysia Italy
Group 2 St. Lucia Mozambique Kenya
Azerbaijan Swaziland Netherlands Latvia
China Tanzania Nicaragua Lithuania
Kazakhstan Uganda Niger Malawi
Moldova Uruguay Nigeria Malta
Mongolia Pakistan Mexico
Turkmenistan Romania Morocco
Ukraine Senegal New Zealand
Uzbekistan Singapore Norway
Slovak Republic Papua New Guinea
Slovenia Philippines
Tajikistan Portugal
Thailand Rwanda
United Kingdom Spain
Venezuela, RB Sweden
Vietnam Switzerland
Yemen, Rep. Tunisia
Zambia Turkey
Table 4: Estimated grouping for the group ﬁxed eﬀects estimator, ﬁve groups.
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Figure 2: Estimated time trends for each group. The time trends are normalized such that they have an
average of zero.
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3-year Polity Channels
Parameters
yit 4.02*** 3.36*** 1.55***
(0.24) (0.26) (0.31)
y2it −0.18*** −0.18*** −0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
git −1.05*** −2.15*** −1.82***
(0.30) (0.43) (0.57)
yitgit 0.04 0.24*** 0.13**
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Emissions-inequality elasticity
U.S. (2005) -0.64 0.35 -0.43
India (2005) -0.75 -0.33 -0.81
Threshold y∗ 27.6 9.13 13.9
Country eﬀects Group Group Group
Year eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 5 5 5
Observations 1279 2752 2270
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis. For a detailed description of the speciﬁcation for each column, see text.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Sensitivity analysis. We perform robustness checks in several directions. We report some of
the results in Table 5. We considered many other robustness checks: diﬀerent number of groups;
diﬀerent GINI measures (from Gruen and Klasen, 2008); diﬀerent time periods, etc. The results
from these models do not change our main ﬁndings. The starting point for the sensitivity analysis
is the group ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. First, we estimate the model with data averaged to 3-year
averages (Table 5, ﬁrst column). This reduces the unbalancedness of the data, and checks that
our results are not driven by short-run ﬂuctuations. Note that our main ﬁndings are unchanged:
(i) the sign of the emission-inequality elasticity is negative at low values of income, and positive
for a suﬃciently rich country; (ii) there is an inverted-U shaped relationship between income and
carbon emissions. However, the threshold value of income is out of sample, so that both reported
estimated elasticities are negative. This could be due to lack of precision because of the reduced
sample size, see for example the relatively high standard error of the interaction term.
Second, we investigate whether the relationship holds even if we include some plausible trans-
mission channels. In particular, we control for the quality of institutions that could be a proxy
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for environmental regulations by including the Polity measure (Table 5, column Polity). We also
control for other transmission channels by including as additional variables the share of popula-
tion living in cities, and the shares of agriculture, manufacturing, and services (Table 5, column
Channels). None of these robustness checks change our conclusions. This suggests that the
income-contingent eﬀect of inequality on emissions persists beyond these plausible transmission
channels.
Third, we estimate a ﬁxed eﬀects model using the data set described in Gruen and Klasen
(2008), which is based on the World Income Inequality Database (WIID). The adjustments done by
Gruen and Klasen (2008) use a regression-based method to deal hamronize the income and income
unit concepts used in the diﬀerent data points in WIID. The results are reported in Appendix
A, Table 6. We ﬁnd that the results are not driven by the choice of WIID versus SWIID (the
data set used for our main results). At the same time, SWIID provides us with a substantially
larger number of observations. The small number of observations in WIID is problematic when
we try to estimate the group ﬁxed eﬀects model. Therefore, although there are some conceptual
advantages of WIID over SWIID (see Jenkins, 2014), the advantages of SWIID dominate those for
our purposes.
6 Conclusion
Based on a substantially larger data set (in both regional and temporal coverage) than the existing
literature, we investigate the theoretically ambiguous link between income inequality and emissions.
We ﬁnd that the relationship depends on the level of income. Using an arguably superior group-
ﬁxed eﬀects estimator, we show that for low and middle-income economies, higher income inequality
is associated with lower carbon emissions while in upper middle-income and high-income economies,
higher income inequality increases per capita emissions. The result is robust to the inclusion of
plausible transmission variables as well as diﬀerent data sources or aggregations. Our paper also
illustrates the usefulness of the group ﬁxed eﬀects estimator which helps to address some of the
short-comings in standard panel econometric approaches to this question.
With regard to the theoretical literature discussed above, it may be the case that in poor
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countries, the claims made by Ravallion et al. (2000) and Heerink et al. (2001) are particularly
pertinent. In highly unequal poor societies a large share of the population lives essentially outside
of the carbon economy and produces few emissions while the very rich already have lower marginal
propensities to emit than middle income groups which is consistent with micro-level estimations
of carbon footprints (e.g. Grunewald et al. 2011; Serino and Klasen, 2015); in contrast in richer
economies, the political economy mechanisms proposed in the literature may be at work where in
more equal societies, it is easier to arrive at a social consensus on environmental policies and the rel-
ative power of groups that beneﬁt from emissions (e.g. owners of capital) is weaker. More research
is required to better understand the drivers of this income contingent empirical relationship.
These ﬁndings are also quite important for policy. While for richer countries, the reduction of
inequality can facilitiate reductions in emissions, in poorer countries there is a clear trade-oﬀ. That
trade-oﬀ can only be addressed if one can ensure that higher incomes of poorer population groups
do not translate into higher emissions by, for example, ensuring that the higher energy needs are
largely met by renewable energy technologies. (Maybe you can then refer again to Steckel et al.
2014, the Nature Climate Change Paper)
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A Results using WIID
This appendix reports the results of estimating the parameters in a ﬁxed eﬀects using two diﬀerent
data sets on income inequality. The second column (Benchmark) in Table 6 corresponds to the
ﬁxed eﬀect results reported in the text (Table 3, column FE). The ﬁrst column estimates the same
ﬁxed eﬀects model using the data set described in Gruen and Klasen (2008).
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Gruen and Klasen Benchmark
Parameters
yit 2.49** 2.72***
(0.98) (0.93)
y2it -0.12*** -0.15***
(0.04) (0.04)
git -0.788 -1.18
(1.04) (1.14)
yitgit 0.0611 0.13
(0.12) (0.13)
Table 6: Parameter estimates for the benchmark model. Dependent variable: log of per capita carbon
dioxide emissions, eit. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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